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Abstract 
We construct a model to examine the relation between family ties and corruption. 
The overall effect of strong family ties on the incentive to be corrupt can be 
ambiguous due to the presence of conflicting mechanisms. The model also shows 
that the measure of family ties can be crucial in determining its observed effect on 
corruption, thus offering a theoretical foundation on why the empirical outcomes 
entailing cross-country comparisons can differ from the outcomes of micro-level 
empirical investigations. This aspect of the theoretical framework is verified by our 
empirical analysis: Using micro-level data, we show that, in contrast to conventional 
wisdom and cross-country comparisons, stronger family ties reduce the approval for 
a broad set of activities that measure corruption.  
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1   Introduction 
Corruption is a phenomenon whose adverse social and economic effects can be wide-
ranging (e.g., Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). For this reason, the identification of 
various factors that fuel corruption has held a prominent place in the research agenda of 
many fields, including economics. As a result, a large body of work has indeed 
pinpointed several factors that are responsible for high levels of corruption – factors that 
include economic, administrative, historical, and cultural ones.1 Our study contributes to 
a further understanding of the cultural sources behind high corruption, as it aims at 
investigating, both theoretically and empirically, how family ties can potentially affect 
the level of corruption.   
     Conventional wisdom would suggest that strong family ties are a fillip for corruption, 
in line with Banfield’s (1958) arguments about ‘amoral familism’. Interestingly, however, 
the results from existing empirical work on the link between corruption and family ties, 
is rather mixed: While the study by Marè et al. (2016) finds that stronger family ties are 
associated with higher levels of corruption, Ljunge (2015) reports that stronger family 
ties promote civic virtues – among them, the disapproval of corruption.  
     In general, while the link between family ties and corruption has already attracted the 
interest of empirically-oriented work, the existing literature lacks a systematic 
theoretical study that explains possible mechanisms through which strong family ties 
affect people’s attitudes towards corruption. The main aim of our study is to fill this gap 
in the literature. From a certain perspective, our theoretical model delivers mechanisms 
that explain why the effect of family ties on corruption can be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, people’s desire to retain strong family ties reduces the range of high-productivity 
opportunities to which they can be employed, thus tempting them to compensate for 
this shortfall through the ill-gotten gains of corrupt behaviour. On the other hand, 
however, the expected utility cost that emanates from the stigma attached to the 
revelation of corrupt behaviour, is more pronounced for people who possess a sense of 
                                                 
1 This literature is very extensive and has traced several factors, such as opportunities for rents and 
discretionary power (Klitgaard 1988); regulation, taxation and below market-price provision of goods (Tanzi 
1988; De Soto 1989); and the level of public sector wages (Haque and Sahay 1996) among others. Treisman 
(2000) explores a series of determinants that are correlated with corruption, such as legal origin and 
institutions, whereas Barr and Serra (2010) emphasise the role of culture and norms.  
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strong family ties, thus acting as a counter-incentive for them to seek illegal rents 
through corruption. Overall, when the measure of strong family ties is the population 
share of those who abide by them, family ties may be associated with either more or less 
favourable attitudes towards corrupt behaviour – and, therefore, with either higher or 
lower incidence of corruption – depending on which of the two opposing mechanisms 
prevails. Nevertheless, there is another perspective that involves the potential measures 
of strong family ties in our model.  In addition to the prevalence of different family 
values among the population, our theory also pinpoints a different measure of family 
ties – i.e., the component that measures the utility accruing as a result of retaining close 
ties with one’s family. Under this alternative measure, the relation between family ties 
and corruption is unambiguously negative. In other words, when the utility value of 
retaining strong family ties increases, the incentive to be corrupt declines due to the 
strength of the aforementioned, stigma-related mechanism.        
     In the empirical analysis, we test our reduced-form hypothesis using micro-level data 
from the European Values Study (EVS). As a means of measuring the strength of family 
ties, we adopt a variable developed by Alesina and Giuliano (2010) in their study on the 
economic implications of family ties. The empirical results we obtain are unambiguously 
in support of the hypothesis that stronger family ties are associated with attitudes less 
favourable to corruption, hence they are in accordance with the empirical outcomes in 
Ljunge (2015). Our results are robust to several different specifications, such as 
controlling for region fixed effects that captures even more unobservables, and to the 
use of different samples, e.g., the World Value Survey (WVS) instead of the EVS. 
Furthermore, to mitigate any concerns of endogeneity, we confirm our benchmark 
findings by conducting an IV analysis.2 Generally speaking, our empirical results are in 
line with broader arguments that stress the importance of familial experiences in 
determining civic values (e.g., Wilson 1993). 
     Despite the fact that there are reasonable arguments to support an outcome whereby 
strong family ties reduce the incidence of corruption, still conventional wisdom and 
casual observation may be at odds with this view. After all, a simple observation of the 
                                                 
2 Ljunge’s (2015) approach is to conduct a 2nd-generation immigrant analysis in order to eliminate omitted 
variable bias concerns, using the European Social Survey (ESS). However, the ESS does not use the same set 
of questions we use as measures of attitudes towards corruption.      
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European continent, for example, can reveal that corruption is more widespread among 
countries in Southern Europe – in which strong family ties are also a common 
characteristic – compared to Northern European countries – in which strong family ties 
are not as pervasive. How can this observation reconcile with our theoretical and 
empirical results? To see this, recall that, in our theoretical framework, it is possible that 
while the share of the population with preferences for retaining strong family ties (i.e., 
an aggregate measure) is positively related to corruption, at the same time the utility 
value of retaining strong family ties is inversely related to corruption. In this respect, our 
micro-level empirical approach is primarily capturing outcomes that are consistent with 
the latter mechanism, given that our main source of variation is across-individual 
variation, without being necessarily at odds with cross-country comparisons on the 
issue. Indeed, we conduct an individual-level analysis and our results are derived after 
accounting for a wide range of individual and country controls such as country and year 
fixed effects, thus we obtain within-country estimates. Therefore, our results should be 
primarily interpreted as suggesting that if two individuals live in the same county and 
are thus faced with the same institutional/historical/cultural background of the 
country, then the individuals that have stronger family ties will be less favourable 
towards corruption. 
     All in all, our study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature that investigates the determinants of corruption. As we stated earlier, this 
literature is extensive and has identified several economic, institutional, historical and 
cultural factors (e.g., Klitgaard 1988; Tanzi 1988 De Soto 1989; Haque and Sahay 1996; 
Treisman 2000; Barr and Serra 2010). Second, it contributes to the literature that 
investigates the impact of family ties on various economic and social outcomes. This 
literature has identified the implications of strong family ties for labour market 
outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2010; Alesina et al. 2015), geographical mobility 
(Giuliano 2007; Alesina and Giuliano 2010), education (Duranton et al. 2009), gender 
roles (Alesina and Giuliano 2013), economic systems and reform (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Brumm and Brumm 2017; Galasso and Profeta 2018), trust (Alesina and Giuliano 2011), 
as well as ideology and political participation (Todd 1983; Alesina and Giuliano 2011). 
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     The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model to 
study the underlying mechanisms that link corruption with the strength of family ties. 
Section 3 presents the data, the empirical approach, and our empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes. 
                     
2   Theory   
We consider an overlapping generations economy, populated by a constant mass 
(normalised to 1) of couples who live for three periods – youth, middle age and old age. 
The individuals who comprise a couple are distinguished solely on the basis of 
occupational characteristics, the details of which will be discussed shortly. Nevertheless, 
each couple shares the same personality traits and preferences, and make all their 
decisions jointly. The demographic structure is simple, as each couple gives birth to a 
couple, and so on.  
     When young, couples form their personality traits and adopt the values and norms 
that will ultimately determine their desire to retain strong ties with their families. In this 
study, we are not going to be explicit about the process whereby couples adopt these 
cultural traits. Instead, we shall assume that a fixed fraction (0,1)f   of couples wish to 
retain strong family ties, whereas the remaining fraction 1 f  do not have such a desire. 
This is a scenario where young couples simply adopt their parents’ cultural 
characteristics, hence allowing us to focus purely on the decisions made by couples 
when they are middle-aged. In what follows, couples are going to be distinguished by 
{ , }j s w  where s  stands for couples who have a desire for strong family ties, while w  
stands for couples whose desire for family ties is rather weak (or even absent).  
     During their middle age, couples earn income, enjoy the consumption of (private and 
public) goods, and rear their children. There are two sources of income for each couple 
because the activity to which each individual will be engaged, with the purpose of 
earning income, differs. Particularly, one of them will operate as a perfectly competitive 
supplier of a privately-produced good; the other will be employed by the public sector 
(e.g., as a civil servant) contributing to the procurement of a utility-enhancing public 
good. 
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Private Production      
The producer of the private good will supply Y  units of it, meaning that this is also the 
amount of income that accrues to each couple as a result of private production. We 
follow Alesina et al. (2015) in assuming that the productivity of private sector producers 
is a function of the location in which the coupe decides to reside. If the couple is willing 
to move to any location away from their parents’ place of residence, private production 
will result in (1 )hY ω y   units of output with certainty, where , 0ω y  . If, however, the 
couple restrict themselves in residing to the location of their parents, private production 
will result in the same amount of output, i.e., (1 )hY ω y  , only with probability 
(0,1)π , whereas with probability 1 π  private production will generate lY y  units 
of output. One way to justify this assumption is to think that people can have a greater 
set of productive opportunities, and a better match for their skills, if they are more 
mobile in terms of location.  
Public Sector 
The government distributes an amount of output to each civil servant, with the 
condition that these funds should be used as an input in the operation of a project that 
contributes to the procurement of a utility-enhancing public good. In return, civil 
servants receive a salary 0B   for their services. Contrary to private sector producers, 
we assume that the productivity of individuals who work as civil servants is not affected 
by the location where the couple resides. We will also assume that the production of 
public goods occurs prior to private production.3   
     The government also levies a (lump-sum) tax 0T   from each couple, and uses the 
proceeds to finance its expenses for public sector salaries and for the provision of public 
goods. Using 0G   to denote the amount devoted to public goods’ provision, and 
taking account the unit mass of couples, it follows that the government’s budget is given 
by T G B  . We also assume that all items in the public budget are tied to the 
economy’s output by setting  
 B by , G gy , T τy ,  (1) 
                                                 
3 This assumption is innocuous for our results. See Footnote 6. 
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where , , (0,1)b g τ . Therefore,  
 τ g b  .   (2) 
     With the purpose of introducing the moral hazard problem that will ultimately 
generate the incidence of corruption, we follow Varvarigos and Arsenis (2015) in 
assuming that the delivery of public goods is possible through two types of projects. 
Type- H  projects return either 0γ   units of public goods with probability (0,1)p  or 
(0, )β γ  units of public goods with probability 1 p , for each unit of output invested in 
them. Note that the realisation of the state of nature is independently distributed across 
all Type- H  projects. Type- L  projects, on the other hand, return  ,δ β γ  units of public 
goods with certainty, for each unit of output invested in them. As long as 
(1 )pγ p β δ   , a condition that is assumed to hold hereafter, the expected return of 
Type- H  projects is strictly higher compared to the return of Type- L  projects. For this 
reason, the government imposes a condition on the employment contracts of civil 
servants, obliging them to operate only Type- H  projects. Nevertheless, some civil 
servants may have the incentive to invest only a fraction (0,1)βδ   of the funds allocated 
to them in the operation of a Type- L  project – resulting in an overall return of βδ βδ   
units of public goods per unit of funds allocated to the civil servant – while making the 
false claim that all the funds available to them were invested in the operation of a Type-
H  project, which eventually had a bad realisation of the state of nature. Doing so allows 
them to gain private rents, amounting to a fraction 1 βδ  of the funds that they should 
have invested in the first place. Nevertheless, their malfeasance may be detected by the 
authorities. In the event that the authorities detect and prosecute a case of corruption, 
the civil servant’s penalties involve the loss of his salary, in addition to the loss of his ill-
gotten gains. Furthermore, the stigma and shame associated with the revelation of a civil 
servant’s misconduct is an impediment to the couple’s prospects of enjoying activities 
such as consumption and – for those with preferences for strong family ties – being close 
to their parents. As we shall see shortly, these emotional costs entail a proportional loss 
in utility.  
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     Let us assume that the probability of a Type- j  civil servant being apprehended and 
punished for his transgression, denoted Μ j , is uniformly distributed on [0,1] across all 
civil servants of the same type (i.e., { , }j s w ). Similarly to Varvarigos (2017), this form 
of heterogeneity captures the varying abilities of corrupt civil servants in avoiding the 
revelation of their misdemeanour. For example, it may capture varying degrees of 
vigilance and care in avoiding lifestyle choices and behaviour that could signal their 
excessive income. It may also capture varying degrees of networking with people who 
can assist them in eluding detection and punishment.4 With the purpose of simplifying 
the analysis, we shall employ the following functional form for the probability that a 
Type- j  civil servant’s nefarious activities will be eventually revealed: 
 Μ jj
j
μ
F
 ,  (3) 
where   
 
[0, ] if
[0,1 ] ifj
f j sμ
f j w
  
,   
if
1 ifj
f j s
F
f j w
   
.  (4) 
     If we denote the number of civil servants who will decide to be corrupt by Θ , it 
follows that the amount of public goods offered by the public sector, denoted a , can be 
expressed as {(1 Θ)[ (1 ) ] Θ }a G pγ p β β     . Taking account of (1), this expression can 
be rewritten as  
 [(1 Θ) ( ) ]a gy p γ β β    . (5)        
Preferences 
As we indicated previously, the decision to reside in the close vicinity of the couple’s 
parents will entail a productivity cost, manifested in the potential loss of income from 
private production. The reason why the couple may still decide to do so however, 
relates to their preferences on the issue of family ties. Particularly, a couple who have a 
desire for strong family ties will either enjoy a utility gain if they reside in their parents’ 
                                                 
4 Another underlying assumption here is that the probability of detection is independent of the civil 
servant’s type (i.e., j s  or j w ). This is done purely as a means of analytical simplicity, with minimal cost 
to generality (if any).  
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location, or incur a utility cost if they move away from it. On the contrary, couples who 
have not adopted values that are supportive to strong family ties, do not gain nor lose 
any utility as a result of their choice of residence when they become adults. Formally, 
the middle-aged, Type- j  couple’s utility is given by  
 ( Φ )(1 )j j jU c S a    , (6)   
where jc  denotes consumption of private goods and  
 
if  and the couple reside in their parents' location
Φ if  and the couple reside away from their parents' location
0 if , irrespective of the couple's location
j
φ j s
φ j s
j w
   
 (7)        
such that 0φ  . Furthermore, note that S  captures the proportional loss in utility, due 
to the stigma and shame attached to the revelation of a corrupt civil servant’s 
wrongdoing. Given this, we assume that        
 
(0,1) if the civil servant is corrupt, and eventually revealed as such
0 if the civil servant is corrupt, but avoids detection
0 if the civil servant is honest
σ
S
 
 (8)        
     Note that the specification in (6) assumes that the deleterious effects of stigma do not 
impinge on the utility from public goods. From a technical point of view, this 
assumption eliminates strategic considerations on the incentives to be corrupt among 
Type- w  and Type- s  civil servants. Such strategic effects would impose significant 
mathematical complication, thus obscuring the clarity of our analysis, without adding 
anything to its main implications.     
2.1   The Decisions of Type-w Couples  
Let us consider a couple who do not have a desire to retain strong family ties (i.e., 
j w ). Taking account of (6)-(8), it follows that they will choose to move away from 
their parents’ location, thus earning (1 )hY ω y   units of income from private 
production. As a result, if the civil servant is honest in his involvement with public 
goods delivery, the couple’s utility will be  
 honest honestw wU c a  ,   (9) 
where  
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 (1 )honestw hc Y B T ω g y      ,  (10) 
is the couple’s budget constraint. If the civil servant is corrupt, the couple’s income will 
be augmented by the amount of ill-gotten gains that emanate from his rent-seeking. In 
the event that he is detected, however, he will lose all the gains from his employment in 
the public sector – the salary and the proceeds from illegal rent-seeking – while he and 
his partner will face the consequences of being stigmatised. Under such circumstances, 
the Type- w  couple’s (expected) utility is:   
 , ,(1 Μ ) Μ (1 )corrupt corrupt not  detected corrupt detectedw w w w wU c c σ a     . (11) 
Defining the composite term (0,1)βz δ  , we can substitute (1) and (2) to express the 
budget constraints as follows:   
  1corrupt ,not  detectedw hc Y B z G T     (1 )ω gz y   ,  (12)      
 corrupt ,detectedw hc Y T  (1 )ω g b y     .  (13)     
Next, we can combine (3), (4), (10), (12) and (13) to rewrite the utility functions in (9) and 
(11) as 
 (1 )honestwU ω g y a    , (14) 
and 
 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 1
corrupt w w
w
μ μU ω gz y ω g b y σ a
f f
             
,  (15) 
respectively. The Type- w  civil servant will be corrupt and engage in illegal rent-seeking 
as long as the couple’s (expected) utility from doing so is at least equal to the utility that 
applies if he decides to abscond from any wrongdoing, i.e., if corrupt honestw wU U . Therefore, 
equating (14) and (15) defines a critical value  
  (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )w
g zμ f
g z σ ω g b b
       ,  (16) 
such that civil servants for whom w wμ μ  will be corrupt, whereas those for whom 

w wμ μ  will decide to remain honest. In other words, wμ  is also the number of 
corrupted Type- w  civil servants.  
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2.2   The Decisions of Type-s Couples 
Now, let us consider a couple who have been inculcated with a preference for retaining 
strong ties with their family (i.e., j s ). Given the characteristics of the model, this 
couple may actually have the incentive to stay in the location of their parents, despite 
the potential loss of income from such a decision. If they do so, the couple’s budget 
constraint, following the substitution of Eq. (1) and (2), will be given by   
 
(1 ) with probability
(1 ) with probability 1
hhonest
s
l
Y B T ω g y π
c
Y B T g y π
          
,  (17) 
if the civil servant does not engage in the pursuit of ill-gotten gains, or  
 ,corrupt not  detectedsc  
 
 
1 (1 ) with probability
1 (1 ) with probability 1
h
l
Y B z G T ω gz y π
Y B z G T gz y π
               
, (18) 
 ,corrupt detectedsc  
(1 ) with probability
(1 ) with probability 1
h
l
Y T ω g b y π
Y T g b y π
          
, (19) 
if he does. In the scenario where Type- s  couples move to new locations, their budget 
constraints will be identical to those of Type- w  couples, i.e., (1 )honestsc ω g y   , 
, (1 )corrupt not  detectedsc ω gz y    and corrupt ,detectedsc  (1 )ω g b y   . Together with (3), (4), (6)-(8) 
and (17)-(19), it follows that the couple’s (expected) utility from consumption, 
depending on whether the civil servant is honest or corrupt, can be written as  
 (1 )honestsU πω g y φ a     ,  (20) 
 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s ss
μ μU πω gz y φ πω g b y φ σ a
f f
              
,  (21) 
if they stay in their parents’ location, and  
 (1 )honestsU ω g y φ a     ,  (22) 
 1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ](1 )corrupt s ss
μ μU ω gz y φ ω g b y φ σ a
f f
              
,  (23) 
if they move away from it.  
     With the purpose of improving the focus of our analysis, henceforth we shall adopt 
the approach of Alesina et al. (2015) by imposing a condition which guarantees that the 
couples who have preferences for strong family ties will find optimal to reside close to 
their parents. It should be noted that this assumption accords with evidence showing 
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that strong family ties reduce geographical mobility (Giuliano 2007; Alesina and 
Giuliano 2010). Formally, a sufficient condition is 
 [ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ] ˆ
2
g z π ω σ πω g b b yφ φσ
         .  (24) 
Given the condition in (24), a couple with a desire for strong family ties will always 
choose to remain in their parents’ location, meaning that their utility will be given by 
either (20) or (21).5 As a result, we can use these expressions to examine the civil 
servant’s conduct while in public office. In other words, the critical value sμ  for which 
corrupt honest
s sU U  can be obtained as follows:  
  (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
s
g zμ fσφg z σ πω g b b
y

      
.  (25) 
According to (25), civil servants for whom s sμ μ  will engage in the effort to extract 
illegal rents through their involvement with the public sector, whereas civil servants for 
whom s sμ μ  will remain honest. Alternatively, sμ  is also the number of Type- s  civil 
servants who will be corrupt.  
 
2.3   Family Ties and Corruption 
We can combine (16) and (25) to express the total number of corrupt civil servants as   
 Θ (1 ) ( ) Θ( , )w sθ f θ φ f f φ    ,  (26) 
where  
 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )w
g zθ
g z σ ω g b b
       ,   
(1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )
s
g zθ φ σφg z σ πω g b b
y

      
. (27) 
Substitution of (26) in (5) yields  
 {[1 (1 ) ( ) ] ( ) } ( , )w sa gy θ f θ φ f p γ β β a f φ       . (28)   
Next, we define the composite term 
                                                 
5 The condition in (24) guarantees that the lowest level of utility associated with staying in the parents’ 
location (i.e., when a civil servant is corrupt but apprehended with certainty) exceeds the highest level of 
utility associated with residing to a different location (i.e., when a civil servant is corrupt and evades 
detection with certainty).   
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 (1 )φ π ωy  ,  (29) 
which allows us to get the following results: 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that φˆ φ  . Then Θ( , ) 0f φ
f
   and 
( , ) 0a f φ
f
  . 
 
Proof. From (26) and (28), it is straightforward to establish that Θ( , ) ( )s wf φ θ φ θf
    and 
( , ) [ ( ) ] ( )s w
a f φ θ φ θ gyp γ β
f
     . Using the expressions in (27) and (29), it is 
straightforward to establish that ( )w sθ θ φ  holds as long as  
 (1 )φ π ωy φ φ     .  
Since the condition in (24) holds, φˆ φ   also implies that φ φ  , thus completing the 
proof.   ■ 
 
Lemma 2. Suppose that φˆ φ  . Then: 
i. Θ( , ) 0f φ
f
   and 
( , ) 0a f φ
f
   if ˆ( , )φ φ φ  ; 
ii. Θ( , ) 0f φ
f
   and 
( , ) 0a f φ
f
   if φ φ  . 
 
Proof. Use the proof of Lemma 1 to establish that ( )w sφ φ θ θ φ    and 
( )w sφ φ θ θ φ   .   ■ 
 
     We can formalise the implications on the relation between family ties – when this is 
measured by f  – and corruption through  
 
Proposition 1. The impact of an increase in the population share of people with a desire for 
strong family ties has an ambiguous (i.e., either negative or positive) effect on the incidence of 
corruption and, therefore, on the provision of public goods.   
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Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.   ■ 
  
    The ambiguity emanates from the fact that, for couples whose values are conducive to 
strong family ties, the stigma associated with a civil servant’s misconduct generates two 
conflicting effects on the incentive to be corrupt. On the one hand, the possible income 
loss incurred as a result of their desire to reside close to their parents, while 
relinquishing more productive opportunities elsewhere, mitigates the stigma-induced 
loss in the marginal utility of consumption. This is a mechanism through which strong 
family ties cause a higher incidence of corruption.6 An alternative interpretation is that, 
for couples who abide by strong family ties, the ill-gotten gains of corruption are also 
viewed as the means of covering the shortfall in productivity and income. On the other 
hand, however, the stigma that stems from the revelation of a civil servant’s 
wrongdoing, also mitigates the couple’s enjoyment from residing close to their parents. 
This expected loss in utility acts as a disincentive to engage in nefarious activities while 
in public office, hence generating a mechanism through which family ties cause a lower 
incidence of corruption. Naturally, the impact of family ties on corruption also dictates 
its impact of on a . After all, corruption is manifested through the deliberate choice of 
less productive projects for the procurement of utility-enhancing public goods. 
Consequently, any factor that fuels corruption is bound to reduce the effectiveness of the 
public sector’s production activities, by limiting the amount of goods delivered per unit 
of public investment. 
     Note, however, that in addition to distribution of different types of family values 
among the population, our model includes an additional measure of the strength of 
family ties. This is captured by the parameter φ , i.e., the utility value for people who 
enjoy retaining close ties with their families. In order to investigate its implications on 
the model’s main outcomes, consider the result in  
 
                                                 
6 Qualitatively, our results would be similar in a scenario where the civil servants’ decisions and the delivery 
of public goods materialise after the production of private goods. This is because, with a fraction 1 π  of 
Type- s  couples earning y  from private production, instead of (1 )ω y , the average (private) income of this 
group would still lack behind the average (private) income among Type- w  couples.    
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Lemma 3. It is Θ( , ) 0f φφ
   and 
( , ) 0a f φφ
  . 
 
Proof. Given (27), we have ( ) 0sθ φφ
  . Therefore, from (26) and (28), it is straightforward 
to establish that Θ( , ) ( ) 0sf φ θ φ fφ φ
     and 
( , ) ( ) ( ) 0sa f φ θ φ fgyp γ β
f φ
      .   ■ 
 
     Now, we can establish the impact of this measure of family ties on corruption by 
means of  
 
Proposition 2. The impact of an increase in the utility value of retaining strong family ties on 
corruption, is unambiguously negative. Consequently, it has a positive effect on the provision of 
public goods.  
 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.   ■ 
 
     In terms of intuition, the higher is φ , the stronger is the expected utility loss for a 
couple who contemplate the ill-gotten gains of corruption, but who also consider the 
possible repercussions, including the psychological ones, from the revelation of this 
wrongdoing. For this reason, the utility value from strong family ties alleviates the 
incentive to engage in corrupt activities.   
     There are some important implications from the preceding analysis. Firstly, our 
model provided a theoretical foundation for circumstances when – contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that would view strong family ties as a fillip for corruption - 
factors that are relevant to strong family ties reduce the incidence of corruption. The 
second, and most important one in our opinion, can be clarified through  
 
Proposition 3. The measure of family ties can be crucial in determining its observed effect on 
corruption. It is possible that a higher population share of people with preferences for strong 
family ties increases the willingness to be corrupt, whereas, at the same time, a higher utility 
value of retaining strong family ties reduces the willingness to be corrupt.  
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Proof. It follows from the implications of Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 2 for 
φˆ φ  .   ■    
 
     In other words, the ambiguity with respect to the impact of family ties on corruption 
is not only related to the conflicting underlying mechanisms, but it extends to the 
measure of family ties as well. In the next section, we shall try to resolve the issue 
through an empirical analysis that uses micro-level data to test the reduced-form 
hypothesis of a relation between strong family ties and the approval of corrupt 
behaviour.    
 
3   Empirical Analysis 
3.1   Data and Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we estimate the impact of family ties on corruption-related attitudes 
using data from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is a large-scale cross-
national survey with four waves covering the 1981-2008 period. In our study we use 
data from all four waves wherever available. Overall, a total of 48 countries are included 
in the cumulative dataset based on the four EVS waves. 
Family Ties 
In line with the benchmark studies that study the role of family ties (e.g., Alesina and 
Giuliano 2010) we use three questions to construct the family ties index. The first 
question asks how important is family for the respondent’s life. Answers vary from 1-4 
with “1” indicating that family is very important and “4” indicating it is not important at 
all. The second question asks whether love and respect to parent is taken as given or 
whether it should be earned: The value of “1” indicates that it should always be taken 
for granted and the value of “2” that it should be earned. The third question asks 
whether parents should fulfil their responsibilities towards their children at the expense 
of their own well-being: The value of “1” indicates that they should do the utmost best 
for their children, while “2” indicates that they should not sacrifice their own well-being.  
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     Overall, in all three questions lower values correspond to stronger family times. Note 
that, in order to reduce the number of variables and to combine the three components to 
a single variable, our approach is to conduct a principal component analysis and to 
employ the first component as the explanatory variable.  
Corruption-Related Attitudes 
In order to measure corruption-related attitudes at the individual level, we use four 
different questions whereby respondents are asked whether they justify the following 
acts: cheating on taxes; claiming state benefits (without being entitled to); accepting a 
bribe; and avoiding paying fare on public transport. Each variable takes values from 1 to 
10 with 1 corresponding to “never” and 10 corresponding to “always”. Thus higher 
values of these variables are associated with more favourable views – and, therefore, a 
greater inclination – towards corruption.  
     A crucial point concerns the use of these measures as proxies for corruption. We 
justify this approach on the basis of the existing literature and our own correlations. As 
far as the existing literature is concerned, there are a number of studies that have also 
employed similar measures, extracted from the EVS and the WVS, as proxies for 
corruption. For example, Torgler and Valev (2010) and Palivos and Litina (2016) 
associate corruption with measures of bribe acceptance and tax cheating, while 
Azariadis and Ioannides (2015) do the same with unentitled benefits claims. With regard 
to our own correlations, we have found that, in most cases, these measures (when 
aggregated at the country level) have a positive correlation with actual measures of 
corruption, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index or the ICRG Corruption Index – 
with the correlation coefficient being within the range of 0.23-0.38.7 There are a few 
                                                 
7   The following table reports correlation coefficients between each measure of attitudes and two widely 
known measures of corruption, i.e., the ICRG index and the CPI index, averaged over the period we 
examine. Note that the ICRG and CPI indices are inverse ones.  
 Cheat on 
taxes 
Claim State 
Benefits 
Avoid Fare on Public 
Transport 
Accepting a 
Bribe 
ICRG 1984-
2008 
CPI 
1995-
2008 
Cheat on taxes 1.0000      
Accepting a Bribe 0.4078 1.0000     
Avoid Fare on 
Public Transport 
0.6613 0.4494 1.0000    
Accepting a Bribe 0.5545 0.3997 0.6420 1.0000   
ICRG 1984-2008 -0.0061 -0.1798 -0.3316 -0.3011 1.0000  
CPI 1995-2008 -0.0242 -0.2290 -0.3756 -0.3832 0.9549 1.0000 
 
 18
comments worth making here. Although the avoidance of paying for public transport is 
not an obvious signal of corruption, it still seems to correlate positively with actual 
measures of corruption. Perhaps, it reflects a general mindset whereby it is acceptable to 
promote private gains at the expense of the ‘public’ good. It is exactly for this reason that 
we also find the lack of a significant correlation between the attitudes towards tax 
cheating and the corruption indices (despite the correlation coefficient having the correct 
sign). This may reflect the fact that, when considering tax morale, corruption is only one 
of its many facets that include personal views on the fairness of the tax system, the need 
for redistribution etc. Nevertheless, we still retain this measure in our analysis, since the 
link between tax morale and corruption is widely documented and accepted in the 
literature (e.g., Togler 2014).  
Reduced-Form Specification 
We estimate the reduced-form specification term 
 0 1 2ict ict ict c t ictCA a a FT a Controls I R ε      . (30) 
where ictCA denotes the attitudes towards corruption of an individual i  who leaves in 
country c  and participates in round t  and ictFT  is the measure of family ties, i.e, the 
principal component of previously-mentioned variables. The variable ictControls  is a 
vector of individual-level controls including age, age squared, gender, education, 
religion and employment status. The term cI  denotes country fixed effects and aims to 
capture unobservables associated with the country in which individuals reside, and tR  
denotes EVS round fixed effects, thus capturing unobservables related to the timing of 
the interview that are common across countries. Finally, ictε  is the error term. 
     Naturally, our coefficient of interest in Eq. (30) is 1a . This will identify the impact of 
family ties on the proxies of corruption-related attitudes, accounting for other individual 
characteristics as well as country and year effects.  
Identification 
One limitation of Eq. (30) is that, while it provides simple correlations among the 
variables, it does not address the issue of endogeneity. Nevertheless, both the measure 
of family ties and the measures of corruption could capture attitudes which may be 
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affected by other unobservables that are not captured by our set of controls. To address 
this concern, we conduct an IV analysis using a measure that is not reflecting attitudes 
as an instrument for family ties. In particular, we use a question related to whether 
respondents have experienced the death of their father. Our underlying hypothesis is 
the death of the father has an effect on a person’s perception of family ties – an effect 
that, on the outset, could be either positive or negative. 8 Our analysis indicates that the 
actual correlation between experiencing the death of a parent and the variables that 
capture family ties is negative. The top panel of Table 2 shows the 1st stage estimates, i.e., 
it establishes that family ties become stronger following the loss of a parent. This 
outcome may reflect the fact that a bereavement of this type intensifies the realisation of 
how important the lost parent was for the person affected, hence strengthening their 
feelings on the importance of the family in general. It may also reflect the fact that this 
loss brings the other family members closer to each other, through an increased sense of 
responsibility and through the need for emotional support.9  
     An important issue is to ensure that our instrument does not have any impact on the 
measures of corruption-related attitudes. One concern is that the loss of a parent may 
have financial repercussions for the affected individuals, thus it can ultimately have an 
effect on their perceptions and attitudes towards corruption. As a means of ruling out 
this channel, we have included controls such as education and employment status. 
Another concern is the continuous influence that parents exert on their children’s 
attitudes (including those on corruption) and the possibility that attitudes may change if, 
following a parent’s death, this direct influence disappears. To address this concern, 
restrict our sample to individuals that are above the age of 35 and have thus shaped 
their personality.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Marè et al. (2016) use the relationship with the parents as an instrument of family ties. The reason we 
cannot use this variable is because it is available in the EVS only for 1981, whereas the measures for family 
ties are available from 1990 onwards. Marè et al. (2016) can use this instrumental variable as they aggregate 
it at the country level; in our case, this is not feasible. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rationale 
between their instrument (i.e., closeness to a parent) and ours (i.e., death of a parent) is quite similar.  
9 Later we conduct robustness checks on the IV specification, showing that the results are robust to the loss 
of both parents as well (see Table 6). 
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3.2 Empirical Results 
Benchmark Specification 
Table 1 reports estimates on the impact of the measure of family ties on attitudes 
towards corruption. The dependent variable in Column (1) is “Justifiable: Cheating on 
Taxes”; in Column (2) is “Justifiable: To Claim State Benefits”; in Column (3) is “Justifiable: 
Accepting a Bribe”; and in Column (4) is “Justifiable: Avoiding Fare on Public Transport”. 
The analysis controls for the full set of relevant demographic, socio-economic and 
household characteristics (i.e., age, age squared, gender, education, religion and 
employment status), as well as EVS round and country fixed effects. In all four columns 
we find that weaker family ties are associated with more favourable attitudes towards 
corruption. Line II of Table 1 reports the logit model coefficient in order to get a sense 
about the magnitude of the probability to switch category. For example, we can see that 
a one unit increase in the family ties variable (i.e., weakening of the strength of family 
ties) is associated with individuals having a 0.1 ordered log-odds (0.5 probability 
approximately) to move up one scale in justifying tax cheating. The magnitudes for the 
other variables are similar. Overall, these are not very strong effects, nevertheless they 
are systematic and emerge in all different specifications, even after having controlled for 
several demographic, country and time invariant characteristics. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
IV Estimates 
Table 2 reports IV estimates replicating the analysis of Table 1. In each column we use 
the full set of individual controls. As an instrument we use two variables, i.e., whether 
the father has died. As already mentioned in Section 3.1, and confirmed in the first stage 
estimates, the death of the parent results in family ties becoming stronger. The F-
statistics reported for each column indicate that the instruments are strong. In all four 
cases, we observe that the IV coefficients have become larger, thus hinting towards the 
fact that we rightly try to correct for endogeneity. 
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[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Robustness 
Table 3 replicates the analysis in Table 1 by adopting a more stringent specification. 
Specifically, we employ a full set of regional fixed effects at the NUTS 2 level. The reason 
why we do not adopt this specification from the outset is because we have significantly 
fewer observations. Importantly though, the results remain highly significant and 
similar to the benchmark specification. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
     Table 4 tests the robustness of the explanatory variable by employing another 
measure that is widely used in this literature. This is the sum of the three variables that 
are used as measures of the strength of family ties, as opposed to their principal 
component. To do this, we first make the three variables similar in terms of scale – in 
this case, we bring them to a scale from 1 to 2 – with lower values still indicating 
stronger family ties. Subsequently, we use their sum instead of the first component. 
Columns (1) to (4) refer to the same dependent variables as in Table 1 and they use the 
same full set of controls. The results are – qualitatively and quantitatively – very similar. 
It should be noted that, although not reported here, similar results are also obtained if, 
instead of their sum, we use each of the three measures that are incorporated in the 
family ties index separately.  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
     Table 5 tests the robustness of the benchmark analysis, using the sample from the 
WVS instead. All the variables and the controls are defined in the same exact way, given 
that the two surveys (EVS and WVS) are standardised in terms of questions. The results 
are strikingly similar both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
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    Table 6 tests the robustness of the IV analysis. We introduce two new specifications. In 
Panel A, we restrict our sample to individuals who are above the age of 35, thus less 
likely to be financially dependent on their parents, and more likely to have already 
shaped their personality. Despite the large decrease in the sample, the results are 
qualitatively similar. In Panel B, we use as an instrument the death of both parents. The 
results are somewhat weaker and the F-Stat lower. It appears that the loss of the father 
has a stronger impact on family ties. However, the results still remain significant and 
qualitatively similar.10  
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
4   Conclusions 
This purpose of this paper was to contribute to a further understanding of issues 
surrounding the relation between family ties and corruption. Our theoretical model 
showed that the overall effect of strong family ties on the incentive to be corrupt – and, 
therefore, on the incidence of corruption – can be ambiguous due to the presence of 
conflicting mechanisms. Our theory also pinpointed the possibility that the impact on 
corruption can be quite different, depending on the characteristics that measure the 
relative strength of family ties. This is a point with major implications, as it offers a 
theoretical foundation on why the empirical outcomes entailing cross-country 
comparisons can differ from the outcomes of micro-level empirical investigations. The 
empirical approach we adopted belongs to the latter category, as it used micro-level data 
to examine the effect of family ties on the approval of activities that proxy for corruption 
– activities such as bribery, tax evasion etc. Our empirical results verified that, at the 
individual level, stronger family ties are associated with reduced corruption, thus 
verifying the relevant result of our theory.  
                                                 
10 The fact that the results are even stronger for the case of the death of the father than in the case for the 
death of the mother, possibly reflects some sort of patriarchal family structure. 
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     Naturally, our theoretical model is stylised in many respects, in order to ensure its 
analytical tractability and the clarity of the intuition. As a result, while it directs 
attention to some intuitive mechanisms, unavoidably it does not incorporate other 
mechanisms that can identify additional links on the relation between family ties and 
corruption – for example, nepotism. Furthermore, it is not explicit on the cultural 
transmission process for characteristics such as the preferences for retaining strong 
family ties or the attitudes towards corruption. All these certainly represent worth-
pursuing avenues for future research.     
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Table 1: Benchmark Specication: The Impact of Family Ties on Attitudes Related to
Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Justiable to
Cheat on Tax Claim State Benets Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare
I. Family Ties (PC) 0.191*** 0.110*** 0.138*** 0.211***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Obs. 69021 68858 69432 57847
R-sq. 0.094 0.129 0.082 0.134
II. Family Ties (Logit) 0.097*** 0.071*** 0.147*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 69021 68858 69432 57847
Summary: This table establishes that weaker family ties are possitively correlated
with more favorable attitudes towards corruption. The analysis controls for individual
characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level, employment status,
religious denomination as well as for ESS round and country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim State Benets;
Accept a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating "Always Justiable";
(ii) The "Family Ties" variable is the principal component of three variables, "How important in Family
in your Life", "Love and Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children:
At Expense of/not Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate weaker family ties;
(iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in
parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *
at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 2: IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables:
IV-First Stage (Instrument: Father Died) Dep. Var: Family Ties
Father Died -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
IV (Instrument: Father Died) Dependent Variables
Expl. Var: Family Ties 1.311*** 1.942** 0.889* 1.835*
(0.583) (0.725) (0.523) (0.975)
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 44234 44125 44472 44346
F-Stat 29.85 31.04 30.24 30.34
Summary: This table addresses the issue of endogeneity in Table 1 by instrumenting for family ties with
the incidence of the death of the father and/or the mother. The ndings are are in line with the ndings
in Table 1. The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational
level, employment status, religious denomination as well as for ESS round and country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim State Benets; Accept
a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating "Always Justiable"; (ii)
The "Family Ties" variable is the principal component of three variables, "How important in Family
in your Life", "Love and Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children:
At Expense of/not Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate weaker family ties;
(iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in
parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *
at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 3: Robustness: Regional Fixed E¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Justiable to
Cheat on Tax Claim State Benets Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare
Family Ties 0.169** 0.057*** 0.112*** 0.176***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 23092 23038 23248 13172
R-sq. 0.160 0.174 0.135 0.204
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the
results in Table 1 by controlling for regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim
State Benets; Accept a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with
10 indicating "Always Justiable"; (ii) The "Family Ties" variable is the principal
component of three variables, "How important in Family in your Life", "Love and
Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children: At
Expense of/not Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate
weaker family ties; (iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension
of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical
signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 4: Robustness: Alternative Measures of Family Ties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Justiable to
Cheat on Tax Claim State Benets Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare
I. Family Ties (Sum) 0.143*** 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.136***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 77718 77495 78239 64971
R-sq. 0.088 0.124 0.078 0.129
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the use of an alrernative measure for
family ties. The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational
level, employment status, religious denomination as well as for ESS round and country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim State Benets; Accept
a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating "Always Justiable"; (ii) The
"Family Ties" variable is the sum of the three variables, "How important in Family in your Life", "Love
and Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children: At Expense of/not
Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate weaker family ties; (iii) Robust standard
error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 5: Robustness: World Values Surveys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Justiable to
Cheat on Tax Claim State Benets Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare
I. Family Ties (WVS) 0.161*** 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.146***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 103077 100783 105095 101508
R-sq. 0.107 0.080 0.094 0.130
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the use of an
alrernative sample, i.e., teh World Values Survey. The analysis controls for individual
characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level, employment status,
religious denomination as well as for ESS round and country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim State Benets;
Accept a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating "Always Justiable";
(ii) The "Family Ties" variable is the sum of the three variables, "How important in Family in your Life",
"Love and Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children: At Expense
of/not Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate weaker family ties; (iii) Robust
standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses;
(iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 6: IV Estimates: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cheat on Tax Claim State Benets Accept a Bribe Avoid Transport Fare
Panel A: IV
Adults above 35
Family Ties 1.510** 1.744*** 0.972** 1.826**
(0.571) (0.606) (0.447) (0.831)
Obs 30628 30556 30792 30693
F-Stat 36.390 37.782 36.172 36.350
Panel B: IV
(Inst.: Both Parents Died)
Family Ties 1.355** 1.983*** 0.898* 1.850*
(0.591) (0.749) (0.530) (0.983)
Obs 44147 44037 44388 44260
F-Stat 15.098 15.685 15.394 15.333
EVS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the IV analysis. The analysis controls
for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level, employment
status, religious denomination as well as for ESS round and country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The attitudes related variables ("Justiable to: Cheat on Tax; Claim State Benets; Accept
a Bribe; Avoid Transport Fare") take values from 1-10 with 10 indicating "Always Justiable"; (ii)
The "Family Ties" variable is the principal component of three variables, "How important in Family
in your Life", "Love and Respect Parents: Always/Earned", "Parents Responsibilities to their Children:
At Expense of/not Sacrice Own Well-Being". Higher values of the variable indicate weaker family ties;
(iii) Robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in
parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *
at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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A Variable Denitions and Sources
A.1 EVS Variables
Family Ties
Family Ties (Principal Component). We use three questions to construct the family ties index.
The rst question is "How important is family in your life". Answers vary from 1-4 with 1 indicating
"very important" and 4 indicating "not at all important". The second question asks whether love
and respect to parent is taken as given or whether it should be earned. 1 indicates that it should
always be taken for granted and 2 that it should be earned. The third question asks whether parents
should fulll their responsibilities towards their children at the expense of their own well-being. 1
indicates that they should do the utmost best for their children and 2 that they should not sacrice
their own well-being. Overall, in all three questions higher values indicate weaker family times. In
order to reduce the number of variables and to combine the three components to a single variable
we conduct a Principal Component Analysis.
Family Ties (Sum). This alternative measure of family ties is the sum of the same three questions.
To take the sum we give the same scale to all the variable, i.e., from 1 to 2, with higher values
indicating weaker family ties.
Attitudes Related to Corruption
Justiable: To Cheat on Taxes. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you
nd it justiable to cheat on taxes". The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never"
and 10 denoting "always".
Justiable: To Claim Benets. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you
nd it justiable to claim benets one is not entitled to". The variable takes values from 1 to 10
with 1 denoting "never" and 10 denoting "always".
Justiable: To Take Bribest. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you nd
it justiable to take bribes". The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never" and 10
denoting "always".
Justiable: To Avoid Fare on Public Transport. This variable answers to the question "To
what extend do you nd it justiable to avoid fare on public transport". The variable takes values
from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never" and 10 denoting "always".
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent.
Female. A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is a female and 0 if the individual
is a man.
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Education. Education is an ordered variable taking values from 1-3 with 1 denoting "tertiary
completed", 2 denoting "secondary completed" and 3 denoting"primary completed". The same
classication is used for the controls of paternal, maternal and spouse education.
Religion. Religion takes nine di¤erent values each associated with a di¤erent religious denomina-
tion,.
Employment Status. The employment status of the respondent is a categorical variable
taking values from 1-4 as follows: 1-"full-time", 2"part-time or self-employed", 3-"not participant
(student, retired, other)", 4-"unemployed"..
IV Estimation
Experience a Fathers Death. The variable is derived from the question "Did you even experience
mothers death? ". The variable is binary and takes the value the value 1 if the answer is "yes" and
0 otherwise.
Experience Mothers Death. The variable is derived from the question "Did you even experience
mothers death? ". The variable is binary and takes the value the value 1 if the answer is "yes" and
0 otherwise.
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A.2 WVS Variables
Family Ties
Family Ties (Principal Component). We use three questions to construct the family ties index.
The rst question is "How important is family in your life". Answers vary from 1-4 with 1 indicating
"very important" and 4 indicating "not at all important". The second question asks whether love
and respect to parent is taken as given or whether it should be earned. 1 indicates that it should
always be taken for granted and 2 that it should be earned. The third question asks whether parents
should fulll their responsibilities towards their children at the expense of their own well-being. 1
indicates that they should do the utmost best for their children and 2 that they should not sacrice
their own well-being. Overall, in all three questions higher values indicate weaker family times. In
order to reduce the number of variables and to combine the three components to a single variable
we conduct a Principal Component Analysis.
Family Ties (Sum). This alternative measure of family ties is the sum of the same three questions.
To take the sum we give the same scale to all the variable, i.e., from 1 to 2, with higher values
indicating weaker family ties.
Attitudes Related to Corruption
Justiable: To Cheat on Taxes. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you
nd it justiable to cheat on taxes". The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never"
and 10 denoting "always".
Justiable: To Claim Benets. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you
nd it justiable to claim benets one is not entitled to". The variable takes values from 1 to 10
with 1 denoting "never" and 10 denoting "always".
Justiable: To Take Bribest. This variable answers to the question "To what extend do you nd
it justiable to take bribes". The variable takes values from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never" and 10
denoting "always".
Justiable: To Avoid Fare on Public Transport. This variable answers to the question "To
what extend do you nd it justiable to avoid fare on public transport". The variable takes values
from 1 to 10 with 1 denoting "never" and 10 denoting "always".
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent.
Female. A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is a female and 0 if the individual
is a man.
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Education. Education is an ordered variable taking values from 1-3 with 1 denoting "tertiary
completed", 2 denoting "secondary completed" and 3 denoting"primary completed". The same
classication is used for the controls of paternal, maternal and spouse education.
Religion. Religion takes nine di¤erent values each associated with a di¤erent religious denomina-
tion,.
Employment Status. The employment status of the respondent is a categorical variable
taking values from 1-4 as follows: 1-"full-time", 2"part-time or self-employed", 3-"not participant
(student, retired, other)", 4-"unemployed"..
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